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ABSTRACT 
Today, decentralization and democratic participation are presented as necessary conditions to achieve 
poverty alleviation and ensure the sustainable use of our diminishing natural resources. In small-scale 
fisheries, similar ideas predominate and decentralization has become the new management paradigm 
through the concepts of community-based and co-management. In this paper, we present the conclusions 
of a series of governance analyses recently completed in five African countries (Cameroon, Niger, 
Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia). Relying on a new analytical framework which emphasizes the different 
nature of governance reforms and reflects in particular the distinction between deconcentration, 
devolution and decentralization, these governance analyses propose to assess the various co-management 
programmes implemented in these countries. From these reviews, it appears that the (mainly-donor 
funded and often top-down) fisheries governance reforms implemented in Africa have been successful in 
challenging the previous (centralized) governance system. However, the reviews also suggest that, 
contrary to their intent of empowering primary resource users, the inabilities of local governments, 
deconcentrated agencies and fisherfolk to take up their newfound mandates has frequently resulted in the 
division of influence among local power brokers and in the instrumentalization of the co-management 
process. From a conceptual point of view, the analysis highlights the limits of the conventional approach 
to co-management and questions in particular the view that participation is the key-element to ensure 
successful decentralization. Instead, the document highlights the crucial importance of downward 
accountability as the main ‘driving belt’ ensuring an efficient representativity of the local communities, 
and underscores the importance of recognising the political economy dimension of co-management.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Today, decentralized governance is the overarching paradigm in development and public policy arenas. 
Decentralization and community involvement are presented in particular as necessary conditions for 
effective development [1,2]. Consequently, a large number of programmes and policy reforms promoted 
by international development agencies and NGOs are being carried out in many developing countries, 
with the explicit objective to support decentralization reforms [3]. Applied to a wide range of domains 
and economic sectors, these reforms have been described or labelled under a wide range of terms, such as IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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democratic decentralization, participatory development, devolution, indigenous management, user-
participation, co-management, etc. 
 
In the development literature, the arguments in favour of participation and decentralization are not simply 
based on economic and administrative efficiency. They are often associated with promises of progress in 
public accountability, environmental sustainability and empowerment of poor and vulnerable groups 
[2,3,4]. Amongst other things, decentralization is therefore perceived as one possible avenue to improve 
rural population livelihoods and even as a means for poverty alleviation. The most common argument is 
that decentralization is by definition a mechanism of ‘inclusion’ and ‘empowerment’ [5,1]. Because it 
involves bringing government closer to the governed, in both the spatial and institutional senses, 
decentralised governments, it is said, will be more knowledgeable about, and hence more responsive to, 
the needs of the poorest and marginalized people. This mechanism of inclusion is expected to lead to 
empowerment and pro-poor policies and outcomes [6]. 
 
In small-scale fisheries, after several decades of a strong centralized management approach, 
‘decentralization’ has also become the new paradigm [7,8]. Following the view of influential scholars 
who advocated for governance reform, the consensus in the policy discourse is now largely in favour of 
fisheries management decentralization, either in the form of co-management or community-based 
fisheries management (CBFM) reforms [9,10]. Hardly any country in the developing world has not 
explicitly endorsed co-management or some form of CBFM as one of its main national fisheries policy 
objectives.  
THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO CO-MANAGEMENT: A PLEA FOR MORE 
PARTICIPATION 
In the fisheries literature, the most frequently quoted framework used to analyze decentralization –and, in 
particular, its co-management form- is the framework proposed by McCay and Berkes [11,12]. The core 
idea of this framework (hereafter referred to as the ‘McCay-Berkes’ framework) is that co-management is 
characterized by various partnership arrangements distinguished from one another by the “degrees of 
power-sharing and integration of local and centralized management system” [13, p.466]. Depending on 
these different levels of power devolution, five major generic types of co-management arrangements can 
be defined: Intrusive, Consultative, Cooperative, Advisory, and Informative
a (see Fig.1). 
   
 
Fig.1. McCay – Berkes co-management framework (redrawn from [11]) 
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The McCay-Berkes framework is useful to compare fisheries co-management arrangements and a large 
number of comparative analyses that were proposed in the literature have indeed used this framework for 
this purpose.
b However, the classification on which it is built is merely descriptive. It does not offer any 
analytical ‘handles’ for identifying or assessing the underlying mechanisms associated with the changes 
induced by co-management reforms. Consequently, using this framework for anything other than a 
descriptive purpose may be misleading. In particular, because the core element which structures the 
framework is based on a gradient of power-sharing, using this framework as an ‘explanatory tool’ leads to 
considering the degree of power devolved as the key (explanatory) factor and may in particular lead 
analysts to associate failure(s) of co-management with too little devolution/participation. 
 
Reviewing the literature reveals, indeed, that most co-management studies conclude that there is generally 
not enough participation in the ongoing fisheries reforms and regret that too little responsibility is passed 
down to the community. Pomeroy, for instance [7, p.135], states that “Many attempts at decentralization 
have not delivered a real sharing of resource management power”. One reason for this perceived failure is 
that “Fisheries administrators may be reluctant to relinquish their authority, or portions of it, and 
governments are often opposed to decentralization” [16, pp14-15]. Pomeroy is echoed by Sverdrup-
Jensen and Nielsen [17, p.11], who comment, “Under the present management arrangements situation, 
user groups will often be patronized in possible disputes with government. The latter seems generally 
reluctant to devolve power and bestow legal rights and authority in fisheries management to user groups”. 
As Chirwa [18, p.69] points out, “The [Fisheries Department’s] position of patronage means that the local 
user communities are the recipients rather than the initiators of decisions. They, themselves, are managed, 
together with their resources, by the Fisheries Department.”  
 
The level of devolution is, however, only one dimension to consider within the process of participation. 
As emphasized by Cohen and Uphoff [19], many other important criteria should also be taken into 
account when evaluating a governance reform, e.g. the kind of participation (participation in decision-
making; in implementation; in benefits, in evaluation) or how the process occurs (the basis of 
participation, its form, its extent, its effects) –see Table 1. In other words, assessing the participation 
process –and in the present case the fisheries co-management process– through the degree of participation 
or the level of devolution is not sufficient. This mono-dimensional conceptualization of the process 
reduces governance reform to the degree of participation and does not necessarily capture the main 
factor(s) explaining the degree of success or failure of decentralization reforms. 
 
Table 1. Cohen and Uphoff’s [19] classification of participation 
Types of participation  Participation in decision-making 
Participation in implementation 
Participation in benefits 
Participation in evaluation 
Who participates?  Local residents 
Local leaders 
Government personnel 
Foreign personnel 
How is participation occurring?  Basis of participation 
Form of participation 
Extent of participation 
Effect of participation 
 
 
This point was confirmed empirically by Neiland and Béné [20]. These authors conducted a review of 50 
case-studies of fisheries across 39 countries. Using the information provided by the literature, they 
analysed the management systems of these fisheries and assessed in particular the performance of each of IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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the 50 fisheries, using three criteria: economic efficiency, ecological sustainability, and social equity. At 
the same time, they categorized these fisheries by the degree of participation of their stakeholders in the 
decision-making process, using the degrees of power-sharing as defined by McCay and Berkes (see 
Fig.1). Their analysis shows that there is no tangible correlation between the level of devolution of 
responsibility in the fisheries and the actual performance of these fisheries. In other words, the degree of 
participation did not explain the performance of the system: some fisheries characterized by highly 
centralized management system were doing well, while other, more participatory, fisheries were unable to 
generate good management outcomes –and vice versa.  
 
In fact, as Brett notes, “Maximum participation may not always be possible or efficient” [21, p.1]. Each 
fishery in each society has its own ‘balance point’ on the scale of management intervention and “Some 
fisheries are more effectively managed by governments or intergovernmental bodies [while] some are 
more effectively managed by local communities and non-government bodies, with various mixtures in 
between” [22, p.339]. Thus, advocating for a systematic strong participation by the fishery community 
may not be the correct approach and the issue of how much power is shared may be the wrong question. 
Instead, issues of how this power is shared and who receive(s) this power may be more important. 
THE NEED FOR A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
From a political science perspective, a governance reform may take several forms, involve various agents 
and induce changes of different intensities at different levels. Broadly speaking, three main types of 
reforms are relevant to the discussion of co-management and governance reforms in fisheries: devolution, 
deconcentration and decentralization (Fig.2). Devolution refers to the transfer of rights and 
responsibilities from the government to representatives of user groups at the local level (fisher 
organizations or alike). Deconcentration involves changes in governance where the decision-making 
authority is transferred to lower-level units of bureaucracy or government line agency (provincial and/or 
district level of the Department of fisheries), while decentralization induces transfers of decision-making 
authority and financial capacities related to the fishery management to lower (provincial, district or 
communal) levels of government bodies. Finally, note that co-management as conventionally defined in 
the fishery literature refers to devolution reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Governance reforms in fisheries as a combination of devolution, 
deconcentration and decentralization. Each of these types of reforms leads to different 
patterns of empowerment over natural resources 
from central DoF to local end-users 
(e.g. Beach Village Committee) 
from central to local governments 
(e.g. District Assemblies) 
from central to lower administrative levels 
(e.g. Provincial DoF offices) 
GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
IN FISHERIES 
Devolution 
Deconcentration 
Decentralization IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
  5
LESSONS FROM AFRICA 
Drawing upon the analytical framework described above, a series of five fishery governance evaluations 
were conducted simultaneously in five African countries: Cameroon, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, and 
Zambia, with the specific objective to assess the various co-management programmes that have been –
and are still being- implemented in these countries [24,25,26,27,28]
c.  
 
Synthesizing the findings of these five reports into one single message might be quite uneasy, as the 
overall outcomes of the co-management programmes that they reviewed are rather complex and ‘patchy’. 
In fact, no clear consensus seems to emerge. Some analysts would certainly prefer to emphasize the few 
success stories that have occurred amongst those co-management projects, but a more rigorous 
assessment would also highlight some of the less successful outcomes of these co-management 
experiences. Ultimately, however, the core issue is about governance and the central question remains the 
same: has co-management, as it has been implemented so far in Africa, improved the governance of 
small-scale fisheries for the benefit of the fisherfolk?  
 
From the information collected by the five reports, it seems that the answer to this question is: “not 
necessarily”. While one can hardly dispute that the new governance system introduced by co-management 
was genuinely intended at improving the governance in fisheries, in practice, however, the outcome has 
not systematically been positive. In the majority of the co-management programme reviewed by the five 
documents, the reforms –most of which had been donor-driven and top-down in implementation- failed to 
effectively improve governance. Instead, they simply modified the status quo by altering the distribution 
of power and responsibility between the main fisheries stakeholders.  
 
In particular, an interesting result that emerged from the five reviews is the fact that deconcentration is 
predominant over devolution in the majority of the co-management programmes that were evaluated. If 
one accepts that the 5 countries included in this review provide a reasonable representative ‘sub-sample’ 
of the rest of African fisheries, it seems therefore that in many countries, the establishment of fishery co-
management has led to a partial redistribution of power toward the local (provincial/district) levels of the 
Department of Fishery (DoF). Overall this finding means that, although co-management has been 
recurrently presented in the literature as the way to devolve power towards the end-users of the fisheries, 
in reality the ‘balance’ is still very much in favour of some form of government control –essentially 
through the DoF. What the reviews of the five countries showed, however, is that this control is becoming 
increasingly deconcentrated, probably as a result of the continuous pressure imposed by the donors on the 
governments to show some forms of “good governance”.  
 
The DoFs have not been the only stakeholders that benefited from the reforms. In the ‘fluid’ context of 
rapid institutional changes created by the co-management reforms, the traditional local authorities (village 
chiefs and alike) have also been usually quite successful at moving forward their own agenda. The 
institutional ‘paths’ through which these traditional authorities have managed to enter into the new 
landscape are, however, varied and complex. In some cases, this resulted indirectly from constitutional or 
legislative changes induced by the decentralization reforms that were implemented independently from 
(but sometimes simultaneously with) the co-management reform. This has been the case for instance 
when traditional authorities were included de jure in the decentralization process (as in Niger), thus 
allowing these traditional leaders to regain or reinforce their past influence. In other cases, this resulted 
from their own capacities to interfere and ‘capture’ part of the financial and/or political power that was 
being delegated through the co-management process, using their own existing influence and network, or 
sometimes by establishing strategic alliance with other local elites or the local DoF staff.  
 
The last important result highlighted by the reports concerns decentralization. Although decentralization 
reforms have been widely promoted in a large majority of countries in Africa (with the notable exception IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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of Nigeria), the reports showed very little evidence of any positive interactions between small-scale 
fisheries and the new local government bodies that were created through these decentralization reforms. 
At ‘worst’, there is no effective integration of the small-scale fisheries in the agenda of the local 
authorities; at ‘best’ the only relationship between small-scale fisheries and decentralised institutions is 
through the taxes levied by the local governments –or some of their decentralized agencies- with the 
explicit objective to extract some of the rent generated by the fishery sector.  
 
In this context, it should not come as a surprise to hear that the real beneficiaries of the co-management 
reforms have rarely been the actual end-users of the resources, i.e. the small-scale fishers and fish 
processors. In fact as evidenced through the five reports but also some of the older literature, e.g. [29,30], 
many of these fishers (in particular migrant fishers) have often been excluded from the new co-
management arrangements. Instead, the reforms opened ‘opportunity windows’ for other actors (mainly at 
the local level) to reshape the institutional landscape in ways that allow them to reinforce their own socio-
political, institutional or economic power, often at the detriment of the legitimate end-users of the 
resource. This ‘instrumentalization’ of the co-management (as initially described by Viswanathan et al. 
[8], is not really surprising, as it simply reproduces the social process frequently described in political 
economy through which one group of actors (usually the most powerful, local elite) shape the institutional 
landscape to create a new status quo favourable to their own interests. 
 
Revisiting the framework presented in Fig.2 with these different conclusions leads us to a modified 
representation of the governance reforms as they have effectively been taking place in small-scale 
fisheries in Africa (Fig.3). At the present time, it seem fair to say that the bulk of the power still remains 
with the DoF, but has been partially delegated to lower levels of the hierarchy. This new arrangement is 
beneficial to the top level of the administration as it successfully transfers the load of the monitoring and 
enforcement to the lower-level representatives (local staff), while maintaining the main responsibilities 
and power at the top level through strong upward accountability mechanisms. The other major 
beneficiaries of these reforms are the traditional local leaders who have received another large part of this 
‘decentralized’ power through de jure decentralization legislation or through de facto coercion or 
collusion with the local DoF staff. Finally, the real ‘losers’ are the end-users (fisherfolk) who have gained 
only partial control over the resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3. Share of power in fisheries co-management. In Africa the bulk of the new power 
remains with the DoF but has been partially transferred to the lower levels of the administrative 
hierarchy. Another major player is the local traditional leaders. 
from central DoF to local end-users 
(e.g. Beach Village Committee) 
Devolution 
from central to local governments 
(e.g. District Assemblies) 
from central to lower administrative levels 
(e.g. Provincial DoF offices) 
from central to traditional leaders 
(e.g. village chief) 
GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
IN AFRICAN FISHERIES 
Decentralization 
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LESSONS 
Moving beyond the co-management paradigm 
One of the most fundamental (and urgent) challenges for the academic and donor communities in the next 
few years will be to move beyond the current co-management narrative, recognizing that the existing 
model (crystallized in the McCay-Berkes framework) does not provide an adequate framework to tackle 
the more fundamental issues impeding the sector in its attempts to move toward improved governance. 
“More participation” is not the panacea. In fact, such a view tends to reduce the issues to an overly 
simplistic one-dimensional problem, while governance reforms in fisheries are in reality a much more 
complex, multi-dimensional process.  
Participation, yes but more importantly accountability 
Ensuring or enhancing the participation of the end-users and other legitimate stakeholders in the decision 
making process is important -as correctly pointed out many years ago by Berkes, Pomeroy, Ostrom, and 
others [31,32,33]. The involvement of these end-users is expected, in particular, to increase their sense of 
responsibility and ownership, thus facilitating the self-enforcement of the management system and, in 
principle, the ‘sustainability’ and equity of the system. However, as highlighted by many experts, e.g. 
[34,35,21,36], participation without downward accountability is not effective. The involvement of every 
individual fisher in the decision making-process (that is, direct democracy) is not possible as it would 
increases ad infinitum the transaction costs of the political process. One has therefore to rely on indirect 
democracy, using representatives of the different stakeholder groups. What recent political and social 
sciences research on decentralization has shown, however, is that, any direct devolution of power to these 
representatives is likely to become a source of misuse and abuse, unless these representatives are strongly 
downwardly accountable to the rest of the community [37,38,39,40].  
Focusing on implementation issues  
Co-management –and more broadly governance reforms- are high on the agenda of most African 
countries. It would therefore be misleading to present the failure of co-management reforms as the 
consequence of lack of official political will. Co-management failure comes essentially from 
implementation failures. There is therefore an urgent need for academics to turn their attention toward the 
context-specific nature of co-management implementation [41]. While this has been highlighted many 
times, there is no ‘one sizes fits all’ solution and the success (or failure) of a co-management programme 
will essentially depend on local details: the integrity of the local DoF staff and traditional leaders, the 
balance between the different ethnic and/or socio-cultural groups of fishers (e.g. migrant versus 
indigenous), the presence of local NGOs, and in particular the pre-reform relationship between all these 
different groups and individuals. Note that very little in these failures/successes has to do with the 
resource itself. Most of the issues are institutional.  
Recognizing the political economy of co-management reforms 
In direct relation to the point above, it is crucial to recognize that the socio-institutional landscapes where 
governance reforms in general and co-management in particular are implemented are not ‘empty’. These 
landscapes are in fact the result of a constantly evolving political process that reflects the current 
distribution of power between different actors (essentially at local level) and their control over the 
resources. The introduction of co-management has been perceived –and instrumentalized- by these 
different actors as a new opportunity to continue to shape the socio-institutional landscape in a way that 
allows them to pursue or even increase their political, social or economic power. In this continuous (open 
or more subtle) struggle, the poorest and most marginalized of the fishing community have generally been 
the losers as they usually enter the game with some disadvantages.  IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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The recognition of this political economy dimension has strong implications for the way co-management 
should be planned and implemented. In particular it means that a good understanding of the current 
‘landscape’ and of the current interactions between the different groups likely to be directly or indirectly 
involved (or excluded) by co-management is essential before the first step of the reform is actually 
initiated. This preliminary analysis should help predict the changes that are likely to occur following the 
reform, and thus provide appropriate guidance and recommendations on how to limit the ‘unexpected’ 
and/or negative effects. 
The ‘unavoidable’ traditional leaders 
Although this is not exclusive to Africa -as many Pacific fisheries also seem to be in the same situation- 
African small-scale fisheries are largely still under the strong influence of the local traditional leaders. 
While co-management could have been one way to reduce this influence (if one wished to do so), field 
data reveal that it has in fact been rather the opposite. Because co-management projects were usually 
poorly prepared to face this issue
d, these traditional leaders have usually been one of the groups that 
systematically managed to strengthen their local power during the establishment of co-management 
arrangements. This situation means that a large part of the success (or failure) of these co-management 
reforms depends on the bon-vouloir of these traditional leaders. In particular trying to ignore or bypass 
these traditional leaders would almost systematically prompt some retaliation.  
 
The influence of these traditional leaders is not, however, necessarily always negative. In some cases, 
they have been key players ensuring the success of co-managements projects. When this happens, it is, 
however, essentially the consequence of their own integrity and commitment, rather than the consequence 
of the co-management arrangement itself. Until clear downward accountability mechanisms are 
embedded into the process, co-management projects will always depend on the personal commitment and 
capacities of a few key actors, leaving the overall project’ fate –and its impact on the whole community- 
entirely in the hand of these few leading actors. 
Reconsidering the balance between decentralization and devolution 
As evidenced in the five reports considered here, but also through other sources, e.g. [42,43], fishery co-
management projects have so far suffered from poor, or even inexistent, relationships with the broader 
decentralized governance structures. Several reasons may be brought forward to explain this situation. 
Historically fishery co-management has been promoted –at least in its early stages- independently from 
decentralization [31,44,16]. The fishery literature is also known to be usually remarkably sectoral in its 
analysis and links to rural development or other domains (e.g. water management, agriculture) are 
generally poor [45,46]. On the other ‘side’ of the equation, small-scale fisheries are usually not 
considered as an important or relevant sector by planners and decision-makers. This situation has 
certainly contributed to the current rent-seeking predatory behaviour adopted by many local government 
agencies vis-à-vis the small-scale fisheries.  
 
This predatory relationship can be avoided. A more equitable relationship is possible where both parties 
(the fishery and the local government) could benefit from one another through a much strongly integrated 
approach. Better supported small-scale fisheries could clearly contribute to local economic development, 
thus supporting more effectively the objectives of the local government through revenue generation, but 
also –perhaps more appropriately- through employment (labour buffer), food security and economic 
empowerment of women. Ironically local levels of decision making are known to be much more effective 
to ensure integrated planning than higher (national) levels. Local government should therefore be in a 
good position to integrate and account for the aspirations and needs of the small-scale fisherfolks. It is 
therefore the responsibility of the fisheries stakeholders (starting with the DoFs) to make this integration 
effective for the benefit of the resources and the end-users.   IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
a Note that Kesteven [14], in his commentary on Sen and Nielsen’s 1996 article [15], remarks that the typology 
proposed in the framework is not based on different degrees of power-sharing as stated by its different ‘co-authors’, 
but based on the direction of information flow. 
b See, for instance, the many papers on fishery co-management in the Proceedings of the Bi-Annual Conferences of 
the International Association for the Study of Common Property, available on-line at http://www.indiana.edu 
/~iascp/past.html 
c Those reports are part of the international research programme “Food security and poverty alleviation through 
improved valuation and governance of river fisheries in Africa” funded by BMZ. 
d We recall that this issue of traditional leader was totally absent from the initial McCay-Berkes framework. 
Interestingly, it has emerged in the African literature, see, e.g. [17,30]. 